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 2701 
PREJUDICE, CONSTITUTIONAL MORAL 
PROGRESS, AND BEING “ON THE RIGHT SIDE 
OF HISTORY”:  REFLECTIONS ON 
LOVING V. VIRGINIA AT FIFTY 
Linda C. McClain* 
 
Too many times in our history, our citizens have had to lead the way on 
civil rights while their leaders stood against them . . . .  It is time for the 
[C]ommonwealth [of Virginia] to be on the right side of history and the 
right side of the law. 
—Virginia Attorney General Mark Gerring1 
INTRODUCTION 
Loving v. Virginia2 is a landmark civil rights case that struck down the last 
relic of state-enforced racial segregation (antimiscegenation laws) as an 
unconstitutional “endorsement of the doctrine of White Supremacy.”3  Fifty 
years later, this Symposium also reminds us of the poignant human story 
giving rise to Mildred and Richard Loving’s successful constitutional 
 
*  Professor of Law and Paul M. Siskind Research Scholar, Boston University School of Law.  
I am grateful to Professor Tanya Hernández and the Fordham Law Review for including me 
in the Symposium entitled Fifty Years of Loving v. Virginia and the Continued Pursuit of 
Racial Equality.  For an overview of the Symposium, see R.A. Lenhardt, Tanya K. Hernández 
& Kimani Paul-Emile, Foreword:  Fifty Years of Loving v. Virginia and the Continued Pursuit 
of Racial Equality, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2625 (2018).  Thanks to the Symposium participants 
for valuable conversations; thanks, in particular, to Jonathan Kahn for commenting on an 
earlier draft.  This Article draws on my forthcoming book, Bigotry, Conscience, and Marriage:  
Past and Present Controversies (under contract with Oxford University Press). 
 
 1. Timothy Williams & Trip Gabriel, Virginia’s New Attorney General Opposes Ban on 
Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/24/us/new-
virginia-attorney-general-drops-defense-of-gay-marriage-ban.html [https://perma.cc/3QS8-C 
GCC] (quoting Virginia’s Attorney General Mark Herring’s criticism of his predecessor’s 
defense of Virginia’s antimiscegenation law in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), and 
explanation of his decision not to defend Virginia’s ban on same-sex marriage in federal 
court). 
 2. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 3. Id. at 17 (characterizing the “reasons” given in Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va. 
1955), on which the Supreme Court of Virginia relied in Loving v. Commonwealth, 147 S.E.2d 
78, 80 (Va. 1966)); see also Dorothy E. Roberts, Loving v. Virginia as a Civil Rights Decision, 
59 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 175, 177 (2014) (criticizing the argument that Loving does not deserve 
“a central place in the civil rights canon” (quoting 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:  THE 
CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 291 (2014))). 
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challenge.4  Loving remains a foundational case on the limits on 
governmental authority to regulate marriage and the family.5 
No U.S. Supreme Court case has proven more central to the constitutional 
battle over same-sex marriage than Loving.  In Obergefell v. Hodges,6 the 
case in which the Court held that the fundamental right to marry extends to 
same-sex couples, the majority drew on Loving repeatedly to support its 
reasoning.7  Loving features in controversies over whether state laws 
protecting lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender persons from 
discrimination in public accommodations and other areas of civic life violate 
the First Amendment rights of those with conscientious or religious 
objections to same-sex marriage.  In Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado 
Civil Rights Commission,8 for example, baker Jack Phillips and his amici 
seek to distinguish the “bigotry” and odious racism behind antimiscegenation 
laws from Phillips’s sincere, “decent and honorable” religious convictions 
about marriage.9  Defenders of state antidiscrimination laws, in response, 
enlist Loving to show that discrimination “justified” by history, tradition, or 
religious motivation, however sincere, should not prevail.10 
This Article argues that Loving illustrates a theme of generational moral 
progress in our constitutional jurisprudence:  laws once justified by appeals 
to nature, God’s law and plan for the races, and the well-being of children 
and society are now repudiated as rooted in prejudice.  In Obergefell, Justice 
Kennedy stated that “[t]he nature of injustice is that we may not always see 
it in our own times”; “new insight[s] reveal[] discord between the 
Constitution’s [commitments and] . . . received legal stricture[s].”11  Thus, 
with such insight, the Court struck down antimiscegenation laws in Loving 
and “invidious” laws embodying gender hierarchy in marriage.12  As Justice 
Ginsburg wrote in United States v. Virginia (VMI),13 “the history of our 
Constitution . . . is the story of the extension of constitutional rights and 
 
 4. This Symposium included a panel with the director of the HBO documentary, The 
Loving Story.  For more on the Lovings’ story, see PETER WALLENSTEIN, TELL THE COURT I 
LOVE MY WIFE:  RACE, MARRIAGE, AND LAW—AN AMERICAN HISTORY 215 (2002). 
 5. See generally John DeWitt Gregory & Joanna L. Grossman, The Legacy of Loving, 
51 HOW. L.J. 15 (2007). 
 6. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 7. Id. at 2598–99, 2602–04 (citing Loving, 388 U.S. at 12).  But cf. Obergefell, 135 S. 
Ct. at 2619 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (rejecting this reliance because Loving removed racial 
barriers to marriage but did not change the “core definition of marriage as the union of a man 
and a woman”). 
 8. No. 16-111 (U.S. argued Dec. 5, 2017). 
 9. The Court is hearing Phillips’s appeal from the ruling against him in Craig v. 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272 (Colo. Ct. App. 2015). Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., 
No. 16-111; see also Amicus Curiae Brief of Ryan T. Anderson, Ph.D. et al. in Support of 
Petitioners at 26, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., No. 16-111, 2017 WL 4004529, at *37 (quoting 
reference to “decent and honorable” in the Obergefell majority opinion). 
 10. See Brief of Americans United for Separation of Church and State et al. as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Respondents at 28–30 & n.9, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., No. 16-111, 
2017 WL 4998227, at *28–30 & n.9. 
 11. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598. 
 12. Id. at 2603–04. 
 13. 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
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protections to people once ignored or excluded.”14  This moral reading of the 
Constitution interprets its guarantees of liberty and equality as reflecting 
commitments to “abstract aspirational principles” that we seek to realize over 
time.15  In interpreting or constructing the Constitution, we aim to redeem 
those promises.16 
Looking back at the record in Loving, this Article shows the role played by 
narratives of constitutional moral progress, in which the Lovings and their 
amici indicted Virginia’s antimiscegenation law as an “odious” relic of 
slavery and a present-day reflection of racial prejudice.17  In response, 
Virginia sought to distance such laws from prejudice and white supremacy 
by appealing to “the most recent” social science that identified problems 
posed by “intermarriage,” particularly for children.18  Such work also 
rejected the idea that intermarriage was a path toward progress and freedom 
from prejudice.19  This Article concludes by briefly examining the appeal to 
Loving in arguments about not being on “the wrong side of history” in the 
successful challenge to Virginia’s bans on permitting or recognizing same-
sex marriage. 
I.  PREJUDICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL MORAL PROGRESS:  
ARGUMENTS IN LOVING 
The Court’s opinion in Loving shows traces of Virginia’s various 
rationales for its antimiscegenation laws.  Chief Justice Earl Warren quotes, 
without comment, the trial court’s famous theological justification: 
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and 
he placed them on separate continents.  And but for the interference with 
his arrangement there would be no cause for such marriages.  The fact that 
he separated the races shows that he did not intend for the races to mix.20 
Appeals to scripture to defend antimiscegenation law and oppose any form 
of racial integration had long been a staple in judicial opinions and political 
rhetoric.21 
 
 14. Id. at 557. 
 15. See JAMES E. FLEMING, FIDELITY TO OUR IMPERFECT CONSTITUTION:  FOR MORAL 
READINGS AND AGAINST ORIGINALISMS 4 (2015). 
 16. See JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION:  POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST 
WORLD 5–6 (2011) (introducing the idea of redemption of the Constitution’s promises). 
 17. See infra Part III. 
 18. Transcript of Oral Argument at 27–29, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (No. 
395), reprinted in 64 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES:  CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 959, 986–87 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper 
eds., 1975). 
 19. Brief and Appendix on Behalf of Appellee at 7–9, Loving, 388 U.S. 1 (No. 395), 
reprinted in 64 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES:  CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 18, at 789, 800–02 [hereinafter Brief of Appellee].  
Cites to the record are from this Kurland and Casper volume, with the exception of citations 
to appendicies to the appellee’s brief, which are available at 1967 WL 93641. 
 20. Loving, 388 U.S. at 1, 3 (quoting Loving v. Commonwealth (Va. Cir. Ct. Caroline 
Cty. Jan. 22, 1965)). 
 21. See, e.g., Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 78 (N.M. 2013) (Bosson, 
J., concurring) (“Whatever opinion one might have of the [Loving] trial judge’s religious 
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The Court also quotes from Naim v. Naim,22 on which the Virginia 
Supreme Court relied in its Loving opinion.23  Naim asserts that an “unbroken 
line of decisions”—with the exception of the California case Perez v. 
Lippold24—does not read the Fourteenth Amendment as denying states the 
power to regulate marriage to prevent “the corruption of blood” and a 
“mongrel breed of citizens” that would “weaken or destroy the quality of its 
citizenship.”25  Warren described these supposed “legitimate purposes” as 
“obviously an endorsement of the doctrine of White Supremacy” and 
concluded that “no legitimate overriding purpose independent of invidious 
racial discrimination” justified Virginia’s antimiscegenation law.26  In 
addition to this Equal Protection Clause holding, the Court held that the law 
violated the Due Process Clause by restricting the fundamental right to marry 
by means of invidious racial discrimination.27 
These holdings made it unnecessary for the Court to engage with 
Virginia’s more “modern” argument that, because “the scientific evidence is 
substantially in doubt” as to “whether there was any rational basis for a State 
to treat interracial marriages differently from other marriages,” the Court 
“should defer to the wisdom of the state legislature in adopting its policy of 
discouraging interracial marriage[].”28  The Lovings and their amici 
countered that antimiscegenation laws reflected and perpetuated racial 
prejudice.29  This tension demonstrates how Virginia attempted to escape the 
racist origins and purposes of its antimiscegenation law by recasting it as a 
legitimate way to deal with the psychological and sociological problems 
arising from interracial marriage. 
II.  ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF VIRGINIA’S ANTIMISCEGENATION LAW 
This Part discusses how Virginia attempted to offer an alternative, 
scientific argument against interracial marriage by drawing on sociological 
concerns about the supposed effects of interracial marriage on marital success 
and child well being.  In doing so, this Part illustrates how Virginia 
analogized interracial marriage to other “problematic” marriages that the 
state could bar while ignoring how its “scientific” evidence also applied to 
legally permitted marriages, such as interfaith marriage. 
 
views, which mirrored those of millions of Americans at the time, no one questioned his 
sincerity either or his religious conviction.”). 
 22. 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va. 1955). 
 23. Loving, 388 U.S. at 7. 
 24. 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948). 
 25. Naim, 87 S.E.2d at 756. 
 26. Loving, 388 U.S. at 7, 11 (emphasis added). 
 27. Id. at 12. 
 28. Id. at 8.  The Court rejected Virginia’s “equal application” argument in light of its 
prior invalidation of Florida’s law punishing interracial cohabitation more harshly than 
intraracial cohabitation as “invidious discrimination” prohibited by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Id. at 10.  In McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964), the Court rejected 
Florida’s reliance on Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883), for the argument that the statute 
was lawful because it applied equally to those who committed the intraracial offense. 
McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 188. 
 29. See infra Part III.A. 
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A.  Not Racial Prejudice, but Preventing Problem 
Marriages Doomed by “Difference” 
In Loving, Virginia argued that its antimiscegenation law did not violate 
the Fourteenth Amendment because the framers intended to exclude such 
laws from its terms; thus, the Court should not inquire into “the wisdom, 
propriety or desirability of preventing interracial alliances.”30  Alternatively, 
Virginia argued that “if the Fourteenth Amendment [is] deemed to apply to 
state antimiscegenation statutes, then this statute serves [the] legitimate 
legislative objective of preventing the sociological and psychological evils 
[that] attend interracial marriage.”31  Specifically, Virginia relied on Rabbi 
Albert I. Gordon’s 1964 book Intermarriage:  Interfaith, Interracial, 
Interethnic as “the most recent scientific treatise upon the propriety or 
desirability of interracial marriages from the psychological and sociological 
point of view.”32 
Virginia attempted to recast its antimiscegenation law as rooted not in 
racial prejudice and white supremacy but on “today’s evidence” about the 
detrimental “psychological aspects” of intermarriage.33  During oral 
argument, the Justices repeatedly asked Assistant Attorney General Robert 
McIlwaine whether Virginia’s Racial Integrity Act was anything other than 
“the result of the old slavery days, the old feeling that the white man was 
superior to the colored man, which was exactly what the Fourteenth 
Amendment was adopted to prevent.”34  McIlwaine conceded that the Act, 
as a whole, rested on a premise of white superiority, but he urged that the 
issue should be restricted to whether the two specific provisions in question 
were justifiable in 1967.35  That contemporary justification, he contended, 
citing Gordon’s book as principal authority, stemmed from the psychological 
and sociological problems such marriages posed.36 
Virginia, however, used Gordon’s book strategically and selectively.  It 
brushed aside Gordon’s lengthier treatment of—and warnings against—
interfaith marriage.  In enlisting Gordon’s book to show that interracial 
marriage was especially harmful for children, Virginia left out Gordon’s 
reasoning for that argument:  that such children are likely to suffer the same 
“discriminatory practices,” “indignities,” and complete lack of acceptance by 
white society as their parents.37 
Virginia related its antimiscegenation law to its “natural, direct, and vital 
interest in maximizing the number of successful marriages [that] lead to 
stable homes and families, and in minimizing those [that] do not.”38  It 
 
 30. Brief of Appellee, supra note 19, at 38.  
 31. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 18, at 20. 
 32. Brief of Appellee, supra note 19, at 47.  Gordon was also a trained sociologist. 
 33. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 18, at 27–28, 33. 
 34. Id. at 33. 
 35. Id. at 32–33. 
 36. Id. at 27–28, 33–34. 
 37. ALBERT I. GORDON, INTERMARRIAGE:  INTERFAITH, INTERRACIAL, INTERETHNIC 334 
(1964). 
 38. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 18, at 27. 
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asserted that “the most recent available evidence on the psycho-sociological 
aspect of this question [indicated] that intermarried families are subjected to 
much greater pressures and problems than are those of the intramarried”; 
thus, its “prohibition of racial intermarriage” stood on “the same footing” as 
other restrictions, such as barring polygamous, incestuous, and underage 
marriages, and marriages by “people who are mentally incompetent.”39  
Virginia enlisted Gordon’s book to give “statistical form and basis to the 
proposition that, from a psycho-sociological point of view, interracial 
marriages are detrimental to the individual, to the family, and to the 
society.”40 
Virginia also enlisted Gordon to deflect charges of racial prejudice.  It 
quoted Gordon’s rejection of “the argument that persons who oppose 
intermarriage—religious or racial—are per se prejudiced” and his retort that 
“the tendency to classify all persons who oppose intermarriage as 
‘prejudiced’ is, in itself, a prejudice.”41  While some people’s opposition may 
rest in “prejudice,” Gordon acknowledged “the desire to perpetuate one’s 
own religion [and] to prevent its assimilation [as] understandable and 
reasonable”; “neither races of man nor religious or ethnic groups need offer 
apologies for their desire to perpetuate themselves.”42  Citing Gordon, 
McIlwaine attempted to recast Virginia’s law as being not about “racial 
superiority or inferiority” but simply racial difference,43 and he argued that 
children of the intermarried are harmed by such “difference” in marriage44 
and that higher divorce rates arise from such difference.45 
Virginia’s brief included numerous passages from Gordon about the 
importance of “like marrying like” as a formula for marital happiness and 
divorce prevention.46  But Gordon applied that formula to religion as well.47  
At oral argument, Chief Justice Warren observed that some people have “the 
same feeling about interreligious marriages”—that intermarried families face 
(in McIlwaine’s words) “greater pressures and problems than . . . the 
intramarried”—and asked whether the state could also prohibit interreligious 
marriage for that reason.48  Warren’s observation and question echoed an 
observation made nearly twenty years earlier, in Perez v. Lippold, when the 
Supreme Court of California struck down California’s antimiscegenation 
law:  “If miscegenous marriages can be prohibited because of tensions 
suffered by the progeny, mixed religious unions could be prohibited on the 
 
 39. Id. at 27–28. 
 40. Id. at 28.  Gordon disavowed any reliance on a biological argument in his tallying of 
the costs of intermarriage. GORDON, supra note 37, at 220–21. 
 41. Brief of Appellee, supra note 19, at 48 (emphasis added) (quoting GORDON, supra 
note 37, at 357). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 44. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 18, at 44. 
 46. See Brief of Appellee, supra note 19, app. B (quoting GORDON, supra note 37, at 348–
49, 354). 
 47. Id. (quoting GORDON, supra note 37, at 367–69). 
 48. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 18, at 28. 
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same ground.”49  McIlwaine responded, “I think that the evidence in support 
of the prohibition of interracial marriages is stronger than that for the 
prohibition of interreligious marriages . . . .”50  When questioned about the 
basis for his statement, he rested “particularly” on Gordon’s book.51 
Gordon’s book, however, does not support singling out interracial 
marriage for legal prohibition.  He devotes far more of his book to interfaith 
(interreligious) marriage.52  The book’s criticism of both forms of 
“intermarriage” is clear even from the passages Virginia quoted in its brief.  
For example, Gordon warns that “intermarriage” introduces “major 
differences,” whether religious or racial, that make marital success less likely 
and divorce more likely than in the “average” marriage: 
A rereading of the factual material contained in this study of intermarriage 
in its various forms, and of its effects on those who intermarry, leads me to 
the conclusion that intermarriage is actually a threat to ultimate happiness, 
that the problems that result from the major differences in religion and race 
are so weighty as to require that those who would intermarry be persons of 
far greater strength and courage than is ordinarily required in marriage.  If, 
in the average marriage, there are differences that must be resolved and 
adjustments that must be made, and if, even then, the divorce rate is about 
one in every three marriages, we may expect that the divorce rate for the 
intermarried will be much greater.53 
Such higher risks of divorce, Gordon argues, support the conclusion that 
“intermarriage is unwise for most individuals and must, therefore, be 
regarded as a threat to both personal and group happiness.”54  Instead, “the 
chances of happiness in marriage are greatest for those who are culturally, 
socially, educationally, temperamentally, ethnically, nationally, racially, and 
religiously more like than they are different from each other.”55  Interfaith 
and interracial marriages, Gordon asserts, pose “a threat to the children of 
such” marriages because they “tend to make [children] marginal in their 
relationships to parents, their faiths or their races.”56 
Gordon rejected the argument that intermarriage, of whatever form, was a 
sign of progress.  Thus, Virginia quotes Gordon’s emphatic insistence that 
there was no evidence that intermarriage might be a path to realizing 
“[u]niversal brotherhood, freedom from prejudice, intolerance and hatred of 
 
 49. Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17, 26 (Cal. 1948). 
 50. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 18, at 28. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Chapters 4 through 7 of Gordon’s book address interfaith marriage. See GORDON, 
supra note 37, at 87–219.  Two chapters, chapters 8 and 9, address interracial marriage. Id. at 
220–94.  One short chapter, chapter 10, discusses “Interethnic Marriages.” Id. at 295–309.  
Chapter 11, “What of the Children?” contains more narratives about interfaith marriages than 
interracial ones. Id. at 310–47.  
 53. Brief of Appellee, supra note 19, app. B (second emphasis added) (quoting GORDON, 
supra note 37, at 369–70).  Gordon mentions evidence that “the rate of divorce in cases of 
intermarriage is two to four times as heavy as the ‘normal’ rate.” GORDON, supra note 37, at 
370. 
 54. GORDON, supra note 37, at 369. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 370. 
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the unlike.”57  But, once again, Gordon viewed all forms of intermarriage as 
“a threat to society and . . . not necessarily a promise of a brighter day to 
come.”58  Instead, he insisted, “It is the duty of men and women of different 
faiths, colors and nations to learn to live together in peace and amity while 
maintaining their differences.”59  Gordon’s pervasive concern, as a Rabbi and 
social scientist, was an evident increase in Jewish young people, with more 
opportunities for social contact across lines of religion, “interdating” and 
intermarrying, disregarding the advice of their elders and even threatening 
Jewish survival.60  Throughout his book, however, Gordon, often lumped 
together race and religion, as in the following passage Virginia quotes:  
“intermarriage appears to the major religious bodies, as well as to national 
ethnic and racial groups, to constitute a betrayal of the ideals and values [that] 
each professes”; it “betray[s] . . . family and group values” and often creates 
“a deep hurt” in “family and friends whose values are spurned.”61 
Perhaps Gordon’s book appealed to Virginia’s attorneys because his 
appeal to group pride and a duty to preserve difference seemed to echo 
defenses of antimiscegenation laws as furthering racial pride—and racial 
purity—for both whites and “Negroes.”  However, in passages not quoted by 
Virginia, Gordon rejects any biological basis for ideas of a “pure” race or of 
racial superiority and inferiority; he suggests one can make sense of the 
persistence of these ideas only if one sees them as a pretext for prejudice.62  
Still, in discussing controls on intermarriage, Gordon matter-of-factly reports 
that antimiscegenation laws exist in “over half of the states in the Union” 
“[u]nder the impression that the preservation of our society depends upon 
such methods.”63  Disturbingly, he takes no normative position on such 
laws.64 
B.  Why Are Interracial Marriages Problem Marriages? 
Virginia deployed Gordon’s book strategically to argue that interracial 
marriage causes children to suffer but ignored the role of racial prejudice in 
causing that suffering.  At oral argument, the Court pressed McIlwaine on 
whether “one reason that marriages of this kind are sometimes unsuccessful 
is the existence of the kind of laws that are in issue here, and the attitudes that 
those laws reflect.”65  McIlwaine tried to shift from the role of law by quoting 
 
 57. Brief of Appellee, supra note 19, app. B (quoting GORDON, supra note 37, at 358–60). 
 58. GORDON, supra note 37, at 368. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See, e.g., Daniel Levinson, Rabbi’s Study Opposes Intermarriage, BOS. GLOBE, May 
5, 1964, at 17 (reviewing GORDON, supra note 37).  To put this concern in historical context, 
see, e.g., Meir Ben-Horin, Intermarriage and the Survival of the Jewish People, in 
INTERMARRIAGE AND JEWISH LIFE:  A SYMPOSIUM 38, 42 (Werner J. Cahnman ed., 1963) 
(discussing a “consensus” that religious intermarriage was contrary to Judaism and raising 
question, “Is intermarriage a significant problem that needs to be discussed vis-à-vis the 
survival of the Jewish People?”). 
 61. Brief of Appellee, supra note 19, app. B (quoting GORDON, supra note 37, at 359). 
 62. See GORDON, supra note 37, at 220–21. 
 63. Id. at 66. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 18, at 29. 
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Gordon’s observation that society’s “attitude . . . toward interracial 
marriages . . . ‘causes a child to have almost insuperable difficulties in 
identification.’”66  McIlwaine added that “‘the problems [that] the child of an 
interracial marriage faces are those which no child can come through without 
damages to himself’” given a state interest in “protecting the progeny of 
interracial marriages from these problems.”67 
A closer look at Gordon reveals that the social “attitudes” causing those 
problems are racial prejudice and hostility.  Thus, although children of 
intermarriage—whether interfaith, interracial, or interethnic—suffer, racial 
prejudice makes the children of such marriages particularly “socially 
unfortunate.”68  Gordon explains that, in interfaith marriages, because the 
household does not share a religion, the couple often experiences difficulties 
and children lack a clear identity, lack security, and experience divided 
loyalty.69  Turning to the harms to children from interracial marriage, Gordon 
is briefer and starker:  “The children born of Negro-white marriages in the 
United States are, I believe, among the most socially unfortunate persons in 
all the world if they seek or expect acceptance by the white community in 
America.”70  He also warned that, as teenagers, children will encounter the 
general refusal of whites in the United States to allow “interdating.”71  In 
language unwittingly mirroring Virginia’s interpretation of its 
antimiscegenation law (the “one drop” rule), Gordon takes the baseline of 
racial prejudice as a given: 
To date there is no evidence that persons with even one drop of Negro blood 
will, knowingly, be accepted as whites. . . .  He must find his roots within 
the Negro community or remain unaccepted and unacceptable to the white 
community.  It will do no good to argue whether whites are correct in taking 
such an attitude.  It is far more important to know that, realistically 
speaking, this unfortunately is their attitude.72 
Even though Gordon published Intermarriage in 1964, as Congress 
debated what became the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964, he does not 
give credence to the possibility of moral progress through civil rights.  
Instead, for him, racial prejudice is a moral argument against interracial 
marriage.  Thus, after detailing the pervasive discrimination against “the 
Negro in the United States,” Gordon asserts: 
Unless a miracle occurs that will eliminate discrimination from our 
society—and that does not seem probable—we may expect such children 
 
 66. Id. at 29 (quoting GORDON, supra note 37). 
 67. Id. at 29–30 (quoting GORDON, supra note 37). 
 68. GORDON, supra note 37, at 333. 
 69. Id. at 87–118, 310–47; see, e.g., JAMES H.S. BOSSARD & ELEANOR STOKER BALL, ONE 
MARRIAGE, TWO FAITHS:  GUIDANCE ON INTERFAITH MARRIAGE 126–28 (1957) (discussing 
how children without “unicultural training” do not benefit by the different cultures but are 
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[of interracially married parents] to suffer the same indignities as do their 
parents. 
Whether people, however much they may love each other, have the 
moral right to create such a problem for a child is, of course, debatable.  It 
is my belief that interracially intermarried parents are committing a grave 
offense against their children that is far more serious and even dangerous 
to their welfare than they realize.73 
Omitting the above passage, Virginia’s brief quotes Gordon’s conclusion 
that “[t]he chances for the success of an interracial marriage are, according 
to my research, even less than for that of an inter-faith marriage.”74  Virginia 
also omits the basis for Gordon’s conclusion, that “obvious difference in skin 
color makes for an unfavorable societal attitude toward the intermarried” 
such that “[p]ersons who entertain the thought of entering into an interracial 
marriage should know that they and any children born to them will suffer 
many hardships and disadvantages as the result of such a marriage.”75  
Gordon asserts, “I believe that the institution of marriage certainly does not 
require that we make martyrs of ourselves and of our children.”76 
This closer look at Gordon clarifies that, in his view, racial prejudice and 
discrimination made interracial marriage particularly fraught with problems.  
Without condoning it, Gordon treats such prejudice as a social fact.  But he 
also offers his “personal view,” which seems to be a pluralistic vision of the 
normative good stemming from preserving differences—religious, racial, 
and national—rather than eliminating them.77  Virginia quotes this vision: 
I believe that basic differences will not be eliminated. . . .  [T]he most we 
can hope and work for with any degree of moderate success is that we will 
grow more accustomed to the idea that it is possible for persons of different 
colors, races, nations and religions to work together in many areas even 
while retaining their distinctiveness.78 
Virginia may have quoted this passage to attempt to hold the line on 
dismantling legally compelled racial segregation at marriage after so fiercely 
resisting school desegregation in Brown v. Board of Education.79  The 
context, however, is not legal prohibition of intermarriage but rather 
Gordon’s skepticism that “intermarriage”—whether interfaith, interracial, or 
interethnic—is the path to greater social harmony and the end of “prejudice, 
intolerance, and hatred.”80  Once again, Virginia quotes selectively, omitting 
the reason Gordon criticizes the belief that more black-white marriages could 
overcome the “race problem,” that “Negroes” still lack “social equality” and, 
 
 73. Id. at 334. 
 74. Brief of Appellee, supra note 19, app. B (quoting GORDON, supra note 37, at 348–49). 
 75. GORDON, supra note 37, at 349. 
 76. Id.; cf. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944) (“Parents may be free to 
become martyrs themselves.  But it does not follow they are free . . . to make martyrs of their 
children before they have reached the age of full and legal discretion when they can make that 
choice for themselves.”). 
 77. GORDON, supra note 37, at 357–60. 
 78. Brief of Appellee, supra note 19, app. B (quoting GORDON, supra note 37, at 362). 
 79. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  
 80. GORDON, supra note 37, at 361. 
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although some “Negro and white college youth” may meet and marry, the 
present attitude of “the white man to the Negro” is not likely to change for at 
least a generation.81  Gordon’s quiescence toward the status quo is in striking 
contrast with one of his mentors, social psychologist Gordon W. Allport.  In 
The Nature of Prejudice, Allport acknowledged that prejudice made 
interracial marriage inadvisable under the current conditions, but he also 
argued for dismantling legal segregation and working for conditions that 
made those marriages possible.82  Allport observed, “It is because 
intermarriage would symbolize the abolition of prejudice that it is so 
strenuously fought.”83 
III.  ARGUMENTS MADE BY THE LOVINGS AND THEIR AMICI 
The Lovings’ counsel engaged Virginia’s reliance on Gordon only briefly.  
At oral argument, Bernard Cohen read the following passage from 
Intermarriage:  “[O]ur democracy would soon be defeated if any group on 
the American scene was required to cut itself off from context with persons 
of other religions or races.  The segregation of any group, religious or racial, 
either voluntarily or involuntarily, is unthinkable and even dangerous to the 
body politic.”84  In contrast to Virginia’s selective use of Gordon’s theory to 
demonstrate harms to children from interracial marriage, the Lovings and 
their amici countered that prejudice created the problems.  This Part focuses 
on the role, in their arguments, of appeals to constitutional moral progress of 
repudiating prejudice and discrimination in light of the gradual realization of 
constitutional commitments to equality and liberty. 
A.  Racial Prejudice and Constitutional Moral Progress 
The Lovings urged the Court to take this “appropriate opportunity to strike 
down the last remnants of legalized slavery in our country.”85  
Antimiscegenation laws were “both relics of slavery and expressions of 
modern day racism which brand Negroes as an inferior race.”86  
Antimiscegenation laws, the Lovings argued, “are legalized racial prejudice, 
unsupported by reason or morals, and should not exist in a good society.”87  
This appeal to “morals” and a “good society” is powerful, given the repeated 
quoting—in defenses of antimiscegenation laws—of Maynard v. Hill88 and 
its notion that marriage has “more to do with the morals and civilization of a 
people than any other institution.”89  Moral progress requires abandoning 
such unsupportable laws. 
 
 81. Id. at 364. 
 82. GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 354–55 (1954). 
 83. Id. at 354. 
 84. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 18, at 46. 
 85. Brief for Appellants at 1, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (No. 395). 
 86. Id. at 15. 
 87. Id. at 40. 
 88. 125 U.S. 190 (1888). 
 89. Id. at 205. 
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The amicus briefs in support of the Lovings similarly linked Virginia’s 
laws to racial prejudice and urged their demise as an important measure of 
constitutional progress.90  The NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund 
(the “Fund”) asserted that such laws rested on an “amalgam of superstition, 
mythology, ignorance and pseudoscientific nonsense summoned up to 
support the theories of white supremacy and racial ‘purity.’”91  Further, the 
trial court’s appeal to “Almighty God” also illustrated the appeal to theology, 
which is not a sufficient rationale under the Fourteenth Amendment to 
implement racial discrimination.92 
The Lovings’ brief also highlights the interplay of racial prejudice and 
white men’s “sore conscience” under the “illicit conditions fostered by the 
miscegenation laws”:  they quote Gunnar Myrdal on white men’s sexual 
exploitation of “the Negro female” and the fixation on “the purity of white 
womanhood.”93  They argued that such laws are the “paradigm” of measures 
expressing “the subordinate status of the Negro people and the exalted 
position of the whites . . . functioning chiefly as the State’s official symbol 
of a caste system.”94  They “inflict[] indignity upon every person cast . . . as 
not good enough to marry a ‘white person.’”95 
The Japanese American Citizens League also situates the striking down of 
Virginia’s law within a narrative of moral and constitutional progress by 
asserting that “[t]he torchlight of the Constitution has been wielded to expose 
and burn away these remaining shackles to individual liberty and to cast forth 
light extending “to the full range of conduct which the individual is free to 
pursue.”96  The group’s brief debunks ideas of a pure race and of racial 
superiority by arguing that Virginia’s law is “readily exposed as a racist, 
‘white supremacy’ law.”97  The brief invokes interfaith marriage to condemn 
legal bans on interracial marriage:  “no one would seriously contend” that 
various forms of bans on marriage based on differences—such as “between 
Protestants and Catholics . . . would be constitutional.”98  As with religion, 
so with race:  “Whatever differences may exist between these groups cannot 
provide proper bases for fixing public policy.”99 
 
 90. See, e.g., Brief of N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., as Amicus 
Curiae at 9–10, 13, Loving, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (No. 395) [hereinafter Fund Brief] (arguing that 
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race prejudices and notions of Negro inferiority used to justify slavery, and later segregation”). 
 91. Id. at 9–10 (referring to the mongrelization rhetoric in Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749, 
756 (1995)). 
 92. Id. at 13–14. 
 93. Brief for Appellants, supra note 85, at 25 (quoting GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN 
DILEMMA:  THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 591 (1962)). 
 94. Id. at 27–28 (quoting GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA:  THE NEGRO 
PROBLEM AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 66 (1962)). 
 95. Id. at 27. 
 96. Brief of Amici Curiae Japanese American Citizens League at 6, Loving v. Virginia, 
388 U.S. 1 (1967) (No. 395). 
 97. Id. at 4. 
 98. Id. at 30. 
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The Fund’s Brief situates invalidating racial prohibitions on marriage as 
part of the “never-ending struggle” of the “Negro in the United States” for 
“full and equal citizenship” and against “laws, customs, practices, usages and 
opinion relegating him to an inferior status.”100  It further invokes the Court’s 
striking down of “all other segregation laws” in urging the Court to strike 
down the antimiscegenation laws, and it argues that these laws “intrude a 
racist dogma into the private and personal relationship of marriage,” which 
is inconsistent with the Fourteenth Amendment.101 
B.  Modern Science, Race Prejudice, and Harms to Children 
While Virginia stressed the harms to children born into interracial 
marriages as a reason to prohibit such marriages,102 the Lovings stressed the 
“immeasurable social harm” (including to children) caused by prohibiting 
those marriages, including rendering children illegitimate.103  To show the 
absence of any rational basis for Virginia’s law, the Lovings and their amici 
enlisted modern scientific understanding of race, particularly the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization’s (UNESCO) 
1952 “Statement on the Nature of Race and Race Differences,” which found 
that “no biological justification exists for prohibiting intermarriage between 
persons of different races.”104  Amici argued that Virginia’s rationales about 
mongrelization and race mixture (as embraced in Naim) are “abhorrent to” 
present day science and jurisprudence.105  Although Chief Justice Warren 
asked counsel for Virginia his opinion about the “very cogent findings on the 
racist view” in the UNESCO report,106 his opinion “stopped short of refuting 
the validity of race as a biological category.”107  But in concluding that the 
purpose of Virginia’s law was to “maintain white supremacy,”108 Loving was 
the “capstone of the Court’s blow to the Jim Crow regime.”109 
In the only amicus brief filed on behalf of the Lovings by religious leaders 
and institutions, the National Catholic Conference for Interracial Justice, the 
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National Catholic Social Action Conference, and several Catholic bishops 
and archbishops in southern dioceses (including Richmond, Virginia) 
asserted that third parties’ “race prejudice” creates suffering for “parties to 
an interracial marriage” and their children—not “anything inherent in the 
family structure of the marriage.”110  By contrast to some studies of the 
harmful effects of polygamy (to which Virginia compared interracial 
marriage), there is no proof that “an interracial marriage, because of the 
nature of such a marriage, is likely to engender similar harmful effects.”111  
Further, they argued that the government should not allow the racial prejudice 
of third persons to justify restrictions on the freedom to marry.112  The brief 
quotes Perez v. Sharp113:  “it is ‘no answer to say that race tension can be 
eradicated through the perpetuation by law of the prejudices that give rise to 
the tension.’”114 
These briefs provide an important contrast to Virginia’s appeal to “social 
attitudes” (i.e., racial prejudice and intolerance of interracial marriage) to 
justify perpetuating legalized racial discrimination.  They also bring to mind 
the Supreme Court’s later statement about racial prejudice in Palmore v. 
Sidoti115:  “Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law 
cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.”116 
CONCLUSION 
Reflecting on Loving invites questions about when “new insights” 
regarding objectionable discrimination and the need to realize better the 
Constitution’s promises are possible.  When same-sex couples, nearly fifty 
years after Loving, challenged Virginia’s defense of marriage laws 
(“DOMA”), the Attorney General of Virginia declined to defend the bans and 
asserted that he did not want to be “on the wrong side of history.”117  He 
criticized his predecessors, who chose to defend racially discriminatory laws 
in Loving and Brown and sex-discriminatory laws in VMI.118  Similarly, the 
Solicitor General of Virginia argued, in federal district court, that the “legal 
principle” of equality was clear in those earlier cases; the problem lay in “the 
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perception about how that principle applied at that time in history.”119  The 
federal district court judge that found Virginia’s DOMA unconstitutional 
opened her opinion with Mildred Loving’s reference, on the fortieth 
anniversary of Loving, to generational progress:  she noted that “the older 
generation’s fears and prejudices have given way” and affirmed her belief in 
the right to marry regardless of race, sex, or sexual orientation.120  In 
Obergefell, Virginia filed a brief supporting same-sex marriage, pointing out 
parallels between the rationales offered for its prohibition and those offered 
long ago to justify antimiscegenation laws.121  Some other southern states 
(including states whose antimiscegenation laws Loving struck down) filed 
amicus briefs in support of bans on same-sex marriage, which insisted that 
“odious” antimiscegenation laws had nothing in common with laws 
preserving the traditional definition of marriage.122  How the Court assesses 
these competing interpretations of Loving and the nation’s civil rights past, 
both in Masterpiece Cakeshop and the next generation of civil rights cases, 
will shape the next chapter in this story of constitutional moral progress.  
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